A court cannot deviate from the terms of a property settlement agreement when evaluating spousal support unless expressly given the power to do so under the agreement.
Divorce, Property Settlement, Equitable Distribution, Life Insurance
The Virginia Court of Appeals recently confirmed a trial court's approach to equitable distribution after divorce. In White v. White, husband, 75, sought divorce from wife, 50. Husband's attorney argued successfully that his future needs should be considered by the court in light of his age and poor health. Indeed, Va. Code 20-107.3(E) requires courts to consider the relative age and health of the parties when distributing a marital estate. The Court of Appeals made clear the trial court did not err by contemplating husband's future needs upon considering these requisite factors.
In Chaplain v. Chaplain, the Virginia Court of Appeals recently reversed a trial court's holding that a premarital agreement was enforceable. Husband, a Virginia native with a twenty million dollar fortune, married Wife, a Moroccan immigrant of limited means. Prior to marriage, Husband arranged for Wife to endorse a premarital agreement, telling Wife, whose literacy was described as "able to read English on a Chinese menu," that she was signing marriage papers. The agreement waived equitable distribution in the event of a divorce and awarded wife only $100,000, if she was still married and living with Husband at the time of this death. Husband made no disclosures about his wealth, telling Wife only that he was "not a wealthy man." While the trial court did not observe any unconscionable aspects to the agreement, the Virginia Court of Appeals disagreed noting the gross disparity in the distribution and the circumstances under which Wife signed the agreement. The trial court will now have a second chance to determine how to properly distribute the marital estate.
Virginia Court of Appeals affirms trial court's distribution of tax refunds from loss on beach home.
Court Invalidates Property Settlement Agreement Due in Divorce due to Mental Incapacity
In Chretien v. Chretian, the Virginia Court of Appeals recently considered the issue of personal injury settlements and their place in equitable distribution schemes. The case was heard in Richmond on appeal from the Circuit Court of Orange.
In Chretien, Ms. Chretian was injured while riding as a passenger on her husband's motorcycle. Mr. Chretian's motorcycle crossed the double-yellow line, ultimately causing an accident. Ms. Chretian reached a settlement with various insurance companies for her injuries in the amount of almost $150,000. Three years after the settlement, the Chretians separated and ultimately divorced.
While the trial court ultimately ruled Mr. Chretian should not benefit from the settlement because of his negligence in causing the accident which injured his wife (a line of reasoning for which the Court of Appeals expressed approval), the Courts did make clear the rule for considering whether personal injury settlements are marital or separate:
Code § 20-107.3 provides: “In the case of any personal injury or workers’ compensation recovery of either party, the marital share as defined in subsection H of this section shall be marital property.” Code § 20-107.3(H) defines “marital share” as that part of the total personal injury or workers’ compensation recovery attributable to lost wages or medical expenses to the extent not covered by health insurance accruing during the marriage and before the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intended that the separation be permanent.
In Chretian, the Court ultimately determined there was no evidence Ms. Chretian's settlement compensated her for anything other than lost wages or unreimbursed medical expenses. Accordingly, the settlement was marital property. Unfortunatly for Mr. Chretian, however, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that equity would not be served by affording Mr. Chretian any of the settlement due to his negligent operation of the motorcycle in the accident.
The Virginia Court of Appeals has reversed a trial court's decision to strike a wife's evidence that a premarital agreement was void because it was unconscionable. In
Chaplain v. Chaplain, the wife contended a premarital agreement was void because she did not understand the terms of the agreement. The prenuptial agreement at issue gave the wife nothing, except the right to $100,000 if she were married to husband when husband died. However, the husband was allegedly worth 20 million dollars. The wife was born in Morocco and claimed she spoke little english when she signed the premarital agreement in 1997. She further claimed that she did not understand the agreement and that she was not provided with a copy of the prenuptial agreement either before or after she signed it. Further, the husband represented that he was a "poor man."
The trial court found that wife failed to make a prima facie case, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further evidence to be taken. The Court noted that there "ample evidence" of a gross disparity in the division of assets, and overreaching to support a finding of unconscionability.
The decision appears to be significant in 2 ways. First, perhaps arguments of unconscionability may hold sway in future cases. Generally, unconscionability arguments fail, but in this case at least, it was successful, and perhaps courts will be more willing to accept such arguments in the future. Second, it shows the appellate court's disapproval of striking evidence prematurely.
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